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21 DEC 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR CIA MEMBER UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Long-Range Requirements for Satellite Image-
Forming Sensors

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.14/213 (COMOR-D-13/29), 14 December 1964

1. This is a briefing memorandum on this subject which is scheduled for consideration by USIB at its 23 December meeting.

2. This paper is largely a reflection of the military views on requirements for reconnaissance which were moderated during the paper's development only in minor detail but not in principle by CIA concepts. The paper does not represent any reconciliation of the fundamentally different requirements philosophies of CIA and DIA. CIA is consistently opposed by DIA on matters which concern the relationship between intelligence requirements for reconnaissance and the cost-effectiveness aspects of the management of this important and expensive collection asset. The Agency believes that there is such a relationship; the DIA insists that there is not. In the CIA view, statements of requirements should take account of costs, risks, and capabilities; they should be validated in terms of what other sources can produce and what specific needs for information exist at a particular time. The DIA and DOD approach is simply to state requirements without regard for those considerations. If the requirements are not fulfilled in their totality, DIA then tends to proclaim the necessity for meeting them, more on the basis that they have been stated, rather than on whether the information is in fact needed at the time. This often results in pressure for missions which may produce only marginal or marginally needed information.

3. CIA would have preferred that COMOR present to the Board a statement of requirements along the lines developed recently by a panel of CIA experts under the chairmanship of [REDACTED]. Their report is attached at TAB A. We tried, without success, to get COMOR to accept such a formulation. We then attempted to inject the following points into the COMOR effort:

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED.

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25X1A a. Guidance to NRO with respect to the numbers of satellite missions. In light of the high costs of the satellite program, CIA believes that NRO should not be given an unlimited license from USIB as to the numbers of missions. CIA believes that when USIB directed COMOR to proceed with preparation of this paper (USIB-D-41.14/198) /COMOR-D-13/27/, 30 October 1964) the Board was also asking for COMOR views on the probable numbers of launches that would be required to meet the intelligence requirements, at least for the next two or three years. Moreover, we note that the DCI's review of the cost/effectiveness of the COMINT program is an effort to relate requirements and management in a particular area of intelligence activity, where heretofore there had been total separation between the two concepts. An estimate as to the number of launches required to satisfy the CIA program is contained in paragraphs 5-6 and 9-10 of the [REDACTED] Panel Report (TAB A).

b. The necessity that requirements should be realistic with respect to numbers of targets and frequencies of coverage. CIA opposes "wish lists" which do not take account of costs and collection capabilities and which are devoid of justifications. We believe that statements regarding the quantity and frequency of coverage should be labeled as estimates of requirements, rather than as "valid" requirements, since they are being laid down for a very long time ahead.

25X1D [REDACTED]

25X1A Attention is invited in this connection to paragraphs 7-10 of the [REDACTED] Panel Report.

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
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4. We were unable to convince COMOR that the Board should give advice to NRO on numbers of missions. We were partially successful [redacted] We were forced to footnote on the matters described in 3.b. and d. above. We note, however, that during the evolution of the COMOR paper, DIA did effect some reduction in its requirements for target coverage, although only in the numbers of targets and not in the frequency of their coverage.

5. Recommendations:

a. That you record with USIB your views on the matters described in paragraph 3 above, and

b. That you propose to the Board that it ask NRO to:

(1) Comment on the adequacy of the paper as guidance for planning and operations and

(2) provide an assessment of the probable number of KH-4 [redacted] needed to meet the stated requirements and their estimated costs for the next two or three years.



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RAY S. CLINE

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Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Attachment: TAB A [redacted]

Panel Report);

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DDI/CGS/Recce: [REDACTED] (18 Dec. 64)

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